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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.

Case No- 920395-CA

JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE,
Defendant-Appellant*

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff Jeannette Osguthorpe in her Brief filed February
2, 1993 has continued an effective strategy which has been used
throughout all of the legal proceedings in this case, i.e.,
inflame the court with emotional arguments so that the law will
be cast aside.

Plaintiff's addendum is full of irrelevant

information which is there for the sole purpose to obtain a
sympathetic response from this Court.

Witness, for example, the

police report at Appendix A19-24, the alleged transcript of
conversation between Jerry and Jeannette Osguthorpe, Appendix
A69-70, and the picture of the Osguthorpe house, Appendix A71.
This effort would not be complete without the traditional citing
of the trial testimony of Mr. Lynn Turnbow, "a neighbor of the
parties" contained on page 31 of Plaintiff's Brief.

Of course,

as is normal, Plaintiff fails to mention that this "neighbor" is
the former husband of Defendant's wife Gwenda, and is the present
boyfriend of the plaintiff.
-1-

It is sincerely hoped that this Court will be able to rise
above the emotionalism of the "deadbeat dad" allegation and
examine this case in the academic and legal context it deserves.
In the context of a legal analysis, therefore, a review of
Plaintiff's Brief shows that she has been unable to refute the
contentions made by Defendant in his opening Brief.

She has

attempted to confuse and misconstrue some of the events which
occurred during this convoluted proceeding in an effort to avoid
the pure and simple legal consequences of this case.

Defendant

will therefore review the original arguments he made in his
opening Brief in light of the response now filed by Plaintiff.
POINT I
THE JANUARY AND MAY ORDERS OF THE LOWER
COURT CONSTITUTE BOTH CRIMINAL AND
CIVIL CONTEMPT.
In Defendant's opening Brief he explained in great detail
the distinctions between criminal and civil contempt.
(Appellant's opening Brief at 26-34).

The language in both the

January and June Orders clearly showed both criminal and civil
contempt was being imposed.

The thirty-day requirement of

incarceration in both orders constituted criminal contempt.
Likewise, the $200 fine also complied with Section 78-32-10.
Defendant in his opening Brief contended that the January
hearing for purposes of this appeal is irrelevant.

(Appellant's

Brief at 42). The arguments advanced by Plaintiff substantiate
this contention.

As correctly noted by Plaintiff, no appeal was

taken by Defendant from the January Order.
12, 15-16).

(Appellant's Brief at

The reason that no appeal was taken was simply that
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Dr. Osguthorpe, by borrowing money with his new wife, was able to
come up with the lump sum amount of $5,000 to cancel his pending
incarceration.
Dr.

Osguthorpe was able to successfully make his payments

for a short time after the January hearing but then again fell
into arrears.

By then, of course, the thirty-day appeal time had

expired and no appeal could be taken.

This principle is even

more dramatically illustrated had there been, for example, a year
between the first order of contempt and the second.

Obviously, a

defendant who is incarcerated a year later from the first hearing
cannot be said to have waived his appellate rights simply because
he did not appeal from the first hearing even though he was only
incarcerated pursuant to the second hearing and order.

Quite

simply, each order of contempt in a divorce proceeding must stand
by itself in both procedure and evidence in order to justify
contempt.

Litigants cannot cite testimony in the original

divorce proceeding or in prior contempt hearings in order to
establish the necessary elements and procedure that must be
present before incarceration can be imposed.
For purposes of this appeal, therefore, Defendant will
readily agree with the plaintiff that the January 24 hearing is
non-appealable and will focus solely upon the May hearing and the
June order.

Understandably, while Plaintiff maintains that the

January hearing is not properly before this Court she relies
solely upon it for the evidentiary basis of contempt and the
procedural events which occurred.

This double speak must be

removed from the issues actually being litigated in this appeal.
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The Court during the May hearing "sustained its previous
January Order" and ordered Defendant to be incarcerated in the
Salt Lake County jail for a period of thirty days together with
any additional time until he complied with the delinquent support
obligation.

Plaintiff maintains that Defendant's assertion that

this was a criminal contempt proceeding is erroneous.

She

states, "Both the January and June Orders were remedial in nature
because they provided Dr. Osguthorpe with a way of avoiding the
jail sentence and contempt citation by simply making the child
support payments required by the Court." (Respondent's Brief at
21) .
The argument made by Plaintiff is the same one referred to
in Defendant's opening Brief where judges and lawyers believe
that the stay of a sentence in order to allow a defendant to
raise money prior to incarceration constitutes a "purge" thereby
making the sentence civil and not criminal.
at 28-29).

(Appellant's Brief

This contention of Plaintiff is simply not correct.

The June 19, 1992 Order states, "If the $3,050 is not paid by
June 24, 1992 at 12:00 noon, a bench warrant shall issue, unless
the defendant submits himself to the Salt Lake County Jail for
incarceration." As happened in this case Defendant served his
entire thirty-day sentence when he was unable to obtain the
necessary funds prior to the date of the ordered incarceration.
Moreover, after the thirty days had expired he would have
continued to serve indefinitely on the civil contempt order until
the amount had been paid.

The "purge" ability only applied to

the sentence beyond the initial thirty days.
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The thirty-day

provision cannot be "purged"•

It is a criminal sentence for past

actions of contempt.
It is the obligation of this Court to correct the
misapplication of criminal contempt which occurs daily in divorce
proceedings.

Merely staying a sentence prior to incarceration

does not convert a criminal sentence of a fixed number of days
into a civil sentence.

The "purge" must be allowed to occur

while the defendant is incarcerated and not prior to the
incarceration!

Because of this misapplication of contempt

numerous defendants each day are being sentenced to jail
sentences without being afforded the criminal procedural rights
they are entitled to under the state and federal Constitution.
If judges such as Judge Wilkinson are going to use the
thirty-day sentencing provision of Section 78-32-10, U.C.A., then
they had better be prepared for the criminal ramifications that
that section imposes.

The flagrant violation of this principle

daily violates the mandate of the Utah Supreme Court in Von Hake
v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1168 (Utah 1988), where the Court
stated, "A contempt order is criminal if its purpose is to
vindicate the court's authority, as by punishing an individual
for disobeying an order, even if the order arises from civil
proceedings.
For the preceding reasons, therefore, the analysis of the
May Order as constituting both criminal and civil contempt has
not been refuted by the plaintiff and is a legally correct
analysis for purposes of this appeal.
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POINT II
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED PROCEDURAL RIGHTS
DURING THE PROCEEDING OF CRIMINAL
CONTEMPT.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant was not denied procedural
rights during either the January or May hearing.

(Appellee's

Brief at 13-14, 16, 23). These contentions are without merit.
This Court in a recent December 1992 opinion stated the
following concerning indirect criminal contempt::
Due process requires a person charged with indirect
criminal contempt "to be advised of the nature of the
action against him [or her], have assistance of counsel,
if requested, have the right to confront witness, and
have the right to offer testimony on his [or her] behalf.
Von Hake, 759 P.2d at 1170 (quoting Burgers v.
Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1982); State v.
Long, 204 Utah Adv. Rpt. 18 (Utah App., Dec. 16, 1992).
In the Long case initial hearings were held as to the reason
why Mr. Long's client did not report to the Salt Lake County
Jail.

When it was determined that this failure to report was due

allegedly from Mr. Long's advice to his client, the Court
recessed the proceedings and required a new hearing specifically
as to the issue of Mr. Long's criminal contempt.

In other words,

just like any other criminal offense, an accused defendant is
entitled to a separate trial with its criminal procedural
protections.
In the instant case, however, as in literally hundreds of
cases each year in the district courts, a father-defendant is
brought to court on a civil order to show cause in the divorce
proceeding which seeks numerous claims of relief such as back
child support, back alimony, attorneys' fees, visitation awards,
-6-

property awards, etc.

All of these claims for relief are civil.

No notice of criminal contempt is ever given.
notice occurred here also.

This same lack of

In the instant case "Plaintiff's

Verified Motion for Judgment, Contempt Order, Sanctions and Other
Relief" filed on September 25, 1991 requested a finding that
Defendant be held in contempt of court.

It did not apprise

Defendant that criminal contempt of court was being sought.
(Appellee's Brief, Appendix A9-14).
When the actual hearing occurred in January a full day of
evidence was offered as to the numerous claims advanced by the
plaintiff.

As is apparentd from the transcript of that

proceeding, no effort was ever made to conform this hearing to a
criminal case.

Defendant was never advised by the court that

this was a criminal action against him, that he had the right to
assistance of counsel if he was unable to afford counsel, that he
had the right to confront witnesses, remain silent or to offer
testimony in his behalf.

The entire proceeding was in the nature

of a civil divorce trial.
It was not until the court made its ruling from the bench
that the matter of criminal contempt was raised.

The court

stated in the January 7, 1992 hearing, "The Court would order,
pursuant to Section 78-32-10—and of course I've indicated he has
been found in contempt—that he be fined $200, and that he be
ordered to spend thirty days in the Salt Lake County Jail."
(Appellant's Appendix at 53).
This type of proceeding which is common in Utah would be
analogous to a situation where a grocery store files a civil
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damages action against an employeefor embezzlement and at the
conclusion of the trial the court orders the pajrment of damages
to the store and the defendant to be incarcerated for criminal
embezzlement.

Obviously, such a result would never occur in any

other context than divorce proceedings which are already muddled
to the point of being almost incomprehensible.
The procedural violations concerning the May hearing were
even more flagrant.

Again, the "Plaintiff's Verified Motion for

Judgment, Attorneys' Fees and Immediate Imposition of Jail
Sentence" did not give Defendant proper notice of a criminal
contempt of court proceeding—a jail sentence can also be for
civil contempt.

(Appellant's Brief at A42-45).

The "Notice of

Hearing" likewise did not inform Defendant of the criminal nature
of the proceeding.

(Appellant's Brief at A47).

During the May proceeding the Court never advised Defendant
of the criminal nature of the action against him, that he had the
right of assistance of counsel or that counsel would be appointed
for him if he could not afford it, that he had the right to
confront witnesses or that he had the right to offer testimony on
his behalf.

No witnesses were sworn and no evidence was taken in

this proceeding with the exception of the proffer by Defendant of
his current income tax forms.

At the conclusion of the hearing

Dr. Osguthorpe stated to the judge "I didn't know today that I
could call witnesses, Your Honor.
motion to show cause.

I thought this was just a

I'm not familiar—that familiar with the

court system." (R. 645).
Defendant like numerous other litigants in the divorce
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system before the Utah courts was "ordered to show cause" why
he should not be held in contempt of court.

As noted by the

Illinois Appellate Court in In Re Marriage of Bettsy 558
N.E.2d 404, 425 (111. App. 1990) if a defendant accused of
criminal contempt has a constitutional right not to testify, he
cannot be required to "show cause" since this violates his right
to remain silent.

In addition, in a criminal contempt the burden

is on the petitioner to prove the charges in the petition beyond
a reasonable doubt and not upon the defendant to prove his
innocence.
There is no other judicial situation where incarceration
occurs because of the actions of a private attorney rather than a
city or state prosecutor.

If criminal contempt is to be a tool

in divorce proceedings then the procedures applicable to any
criminal defendant must be followed to the highest degree. In
the instant case, for example, Defendant served thirty days in
the Salt Lake County Jail and shared his cell with traditional
criminal defendants who were afforded all of the constitutional
rights that criminal defendants are entitled to receive.

His

incarceration, however, was no less painful than those of his
cellmates and he is certainly entitled to the same protections
that even the most heinous criminal defendant receives under our
federal and state constitutional systems.
POINT III
DEFENDANT'S FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED AS TO CIVIL CONTEMPT
BY FAILING TO INQUIRE IF DEFENDANT WAS
INDIGENT AND WHETHER COUNSEL NEEDED TO BE
APPOINTED.
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Plaintiff has made no attempt to refute the contention of
Defendant that civil contempt defendants also require at least
the right to counsel.

Here, Defendant would still be

incarcerated today under the Court's order of civil contempt if
his father had not paid the money owing to the plaintiff.
It is completely against logic and justice to require full
constitutional protections to a father being held in criminal
contempt with a maximum of thirty days but to require no
protections to a father who may be held in jail for months or
even years for failure to pay an obligation he claims he cannot
pay.
The authorities cited by Defendant in his opening Brief are
convincing.

While this is a question of first impression in the

State of Utah, there is no reason not to apply the decisions of
these well-respected courts in requiring the assistance of
counsel where civil contempt is being imposed.

Again, in the

instant case, the defendant's incarceration in the Salt Lake
County Jail was just as traumatic to him during the one day of
civil contempt as any other person who is incarcerated as a
criminal defendant.

It is the loss of liberty and freedom which

is the issue and not the proceeding from which this loss occurs.
POINT IV
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS REQUIRED FOR
CIVIL OR CRIMINAL CONTEMPT AND, IN
ADDITION, THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER
COURT ARE LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT TO
IMPOSE CONTEMPT.
Defendant in attempting to justify the contempt orders
specifically relies upon the January 7 proceeding.
-10-

(Appellee's

Brief at 18-19).

As noted earlier, however, Defendant was not

incarcerated as a result of the January hearing but specifically
as a result of the May hearing.

Even if it is assumed arguendo

that the evidence in the January hearing was sufficient to have
imposed the contempt of court of the January 24 Order, such fact
does not help the appellee in this case.
It is the obligation of the moving party to prove the
required evidentiary basis by the criminal standard of beyond a
reasonable doubt or the civil standard of clear and convincing
evidence each time a separate contempt is being sought.

For

example, if Defendant had a high paying job in January but lost
it in February and was therefore unable to make any continuing
payments, the evidence taken in the January hearing could not be
used as a basis for a subsequent hearing in December.

Moreover,

it is not sufficient for a litigant in a divorce proceeding to
merely show that money is owed by the other party.

While this

will result in a money judgment being levied against the other
party, it is legally insufficient to impose incarceration.

The

moving party must prove that the defendant has the ability to
comply with the court's order and has willfully refused to do so.
In the instant case, the May hearing is clearly procedurally
as well as substantively inadequate to have imposed jail
incarceration.
all.

No testimony under oath was taken by the court at

No proffers of testimony were made.

All that occurred was

the dialogue among the judge, defendant and plaintiff's attorney.
The only evidence offered was by Defendant of his current tax
return which substantiated his claims that he was unable to meet

-11-

these obligations.
Since there was no evidence taken there were no findings
entered.

As noted in Defendant's opening Brief, such findings

are legally required before contempt of court can be imposed.
Thus, Plaintiff's effort to piggyback the May hearing upon the
findings of the January hearing is constitutionally defective
and cannot be allowed to stand.
POINT V
DEFENDANT'S INCARCERATION FOR THIRTY
DAYS IN THE SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL
VIOLATED ARTICLE I SECTION 16 OF THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION WHICH PROVIDES THERE
SHALL BE NO IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT.
Plaintiff has made no attempt to address the constitutional
issue raised by Defendant.

Instead, she has generaly relied upon

her old tactic of trying to inflame this Court as to emotional
issues of nonsupport.

In addition, many of her citations for

this emotional impact relate to testimony or events many years
prior to the May hearing.

The standard of contempt of court as

well as this state constitutional provision requires evidence of
a present ability to pay and a present defiance of the court's
order.

Whatever happened in the past is irrelevant in

determining imprisonment for debt.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF
ATTORNEYS' FEES INCURRED AS A RESULT OF THE
UTAH SUPREME COURT EXTRAORDINARY WRIT ACTION
AND THE FEDERAL COURT HABEAS CORPUS ACTION.
Plaintiff makes the interesting argument that because no
separate notice of appeal was taken from the order of attorneys'
fees issued in accordance with this Court's remand, that
-12-

Defendant has waived any right to now complain.
Brief at 12; 24-25).

(Appellee's

This argument is also without merit.

Defendant properly appealed the June 19, 1992 order of
contempt.

At that time all matters relating to the contempt were

removed from the lower court and placed in the jurisdiction of
this Court.

On July 16, 1992 this Court issued an order "that

the case is temporarily remanded to the trial court for
determination and entry of an award of appellee's costs and
attorneys' fees reasonably incurred in opposing the motion for
stay."
As soon as this hearing had been held the case was sent back
to this Court for disposition.

In effect, this Court appointed

the lower court as a master to assist in the appellate decision.
As such, therefore, Defendant is entitled to properly complain
about the proceedings below which are legitimately connected to
the original notice of appeal filed in this case.
The contention of Plaintiff would require Defendant to pay a
separate filing fee, file a separate docketing statement and file
briefs months or years behind the main action which is the
subject matter of the lawsuit.

Moreover, the court's decision as

to attorneys' fees cannot be deemed a final order but is only an
interlocutory order of the contempt proceeding.
Defendant submits, therefore, that this matter of attorneys'
fees is properly before the court and that the lower court
exceeded its limited jurisdiction granted by this Court in
awarding attorneys' fees incurred in the Supreme Court and
Federal District Court actions.

In any event, the district court
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had no power to make the award when neither Court ordered such
fees be assessed.
Assuming that this Court finds that Defendant's
incarceration was improper and that the contempt of court order
was illegal then Defendant respectfully submits that any award of
attorneys' fees incurred as a result of attempting to stay that
order should also be reversed since Defendant was justified in
seeking the original stay in spite of this Court's preliminary
decision to the contrary.
POINT VII
PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED HER
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS INCURRED IN
CONNECTION WITH THIS APPEAL.
In a final effort to arouse sympathy and emotion on her
behalf Plaintiff's attorney cites selected portions of the record
(some many years old) to further substantiate the "deadbeat dad"
claim made throughout these proceedings.

This Court should keep

in mind, however, that attorneys' fees have already been awarded
to the plaintiff for all of the proceedings from which this
testimony was taken.

The sole question before this Court is

whether in this appeal Plaintiff is entitled to additional
attorneys' fees.
The answer to this question is simple.

If Defendant

prevails in his claim that he was wrongfully incarcerated then he
will be the victor in the appeal and Plaintiff is not entitled to
attorneys' fee regardless of all of the past wrongs she may claim
have occurred during these four-year proceedings.

If, on the

other hand, Defendant loses this appeal, then this Court may
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properly consider awarding her appropriate fees directed solely
to the issues of the appeal upon a finding that she is unable to
pay her own attorneys' fees.
CONCLUSION
This Court, as an appellate court, is obligated to examine
cases much more carefully than in the war zone of the district
courts.

For example, what may be an effective trial tactic to

obtain a favorable verdict in an emotional personal injury case
may not be found legaly proper when viewed in the sanctity of the
appellate court conference room.

Likewise, the smoke and mirror

arguments and emotional pleas which occur daily in the district
courts as to divorce proceedings must be discarded completely so
that a correct legal analysis can be made.
Defendant contends that when the emotional pleas of
Plaintiff are eliminated from this appeal, the record is crystal
clear that the following has occurred: (1) Defendant was not
given proper procedural notice of his rights as to the criminal
contempt conviction he received; (2) the stay of execution of a
criminal contempt order does not amount to a "purging" which
converts such order to a civil contempt as is erroneously
believed by most judges and lawyers in Utah; (3) before a
defendant can be physically incarcerated as to criminal contempt
there must be an evidentiary hearing upon which the moving party
proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant willfully
failed to comply with the court's order; (4) before incarceration
can occur the lower court must specifically make findings as to
this willfulness; (5) since the consequences of civil contempt
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are even more severe than criminal contempt defendants are
entitled to certain elementary rights such as the right to
counsel to prevent unjustified incarcerations; (6) all of the
above principles are applicable to every defendant in a divorce
proceeding no matter how far behind he is in his child support
payments and no matter how bad a person he is claimed to be by
the former spouse*
This case not only affects the rights of Dr. Osguthorpe but
concerns the procedures utilized daily in the State of Utah as to
hundreds of other defendants.

It is hoped that this Court will

recognize the legal ramifications of this decision and will make
the careful legal analysis required to overcome the emotional
fluff permeating the record.
DATED this 18th day of February, 1993.

Craig S. CqS&k
Attorney for Appellant
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